Heidegger and social cognition (by S.
 Gallagher and R. Seté 
Jacobson)

domenica, gennaio 17, 2010
By

It’s our pleasure to publish, with the author’s permission, this important contribution by Shaun
 Gallagher and Rebecca
 Seté 
Jacobson
 (in press). Heidegger and social cognition. In J. Kiverstein and M. Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Shaun
 Gallagher


Philosophy
 and 
Cognitive
 Sciences 
and
 the 
Institute 
of
 Simulation
 and 
Training
 University of
 Central
 Florida
 (USA)
 and
 Philosophy
 Department
 University
 of 
Hertfordshire 
(UK)


and


Rebecca
 Seté 
Jacobson


Philosophy 
Department
 University 
of 
Hertfordshire 
(UK)


Mitsein, 
for
 Heidegger,
 was 
a
 concession
 that

he
 had
 to
 make,
 but
 one
 that
 he 
never 
really
 got
 behind…

[It] 
is,
 in
 truth,
 a
 very
 weak
 idea
 of 
the 
other
… 
(
Gadamer
 2004, 
23)


«Perhaps
 the
 most
 influential
 part
 of
 Heidegger’s
 analysis
 of
 human
 existence
 (Dasein) 
for 
the
 cognitive
 sciences 
is
 his 
concept 
of
 readiness‐to‐hand 
(Zuhandenheit)
 where 
he
 shows
 that
 our 
primary
 stance
 toward 
the 
world,
 or 
our
 primary 
way 
of
 being‐in‐the‐world,
 is
 to 
be 
pragmatically 
involved 
in 
everyday 
contexts.
This 
analysis 
directly
 inspires 
the 
rich 
embodied 
account 
of 
action 
in
 Merleau‐Ponty, 
is 
strongly 
reflected 
in
 Dreyfus’s
 critique 
of 
artificial 
intelligence, 
and 
resonates 
well 
with 
both
 the 
Gibsonian
 concept 
of 
affordances, 
and 
recent
 enactive 
accounts 
of 
perception 
and 
action. 
One 
of
 the 
important 
implications 
of 
this 
analysis 
is 
that 
overly 
cognitive 
accounts 
of 
human
 existence, 
which 
emphasize 
our 
internal 
mental 
representations 
of 
the 
objective 
world,
 and 
which
 both
 the
 philosophical 
tradition
 and
 cognitive
 science 
have 
treated
 as
 central,
 should 
be
 regarded
 as 
something 
derived 
and
 secondary.


The
 argument
 that
 we
 put
 forward
 in
 this
 chapter
 is
 that,
 in
 a
 similar
 way,
 Heidegger’s
 analysis
 of
 being‐with
 (Mitsein)
 goes
 some
 distance
 towards
 a
 more
 adequate
 account
 of
 social
 cognition
 than
 is
 found
 in
 the
 standard
 and
 dominant
 theories 
of 
contemporary 
cognitive 
science, 
but 
that 
in 
this 
case 
his
 analysis 
does
 not 
go
 far
 enough
 and
 misses
 something
 of
 importance.
 Furthermore,
 what
 Heidegger
 overlooks 
in 
his 
analysis
 of
 being‐with
 also 
has
 some 
implications 
for 
how 
he
 conceives
 of 
readiness‐to‐hand.
 Finally, 
we’ll
 suggest 
that
 this 
same 
inadequacy
 is
 reflected
 in 
the
 analyses
 of
 those
 who
 pursue
 a
 Heideggerian
 approach
 in
 several
 related
 areas
 of
 cognitive 
science.
 (…) ». (read more)

Download Heidegger and social cognition by Shaun
 Gallagher and Rebecca
 Seté 
Jacobson
 (in press). In J. Kiverstein and M. Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
 (Pdf format)

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