CFP – “Phenomenology and Consciousness. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate” – Phenomenology and Mind Online Journal

giovedì, 10 Dicembre, 2015

Phenomenology and Consciousness. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
Deadline for paper submission: March 30th, 2016.
Publication of the issue: July, 2016

Advisory Editors:

Elisabetta Sacchi (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, CRESA – Research Centre for Experimental and Applied Epistemology, Milan, Italy); Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin, Italy)


Call for papers:
The Journal ‘Phenomenology and Mind’ is pleased to announce a Call for Papers which will be dedicated to the theme “Phenomenology and Consciousness: the Cognitive Phenomenology Debate”.

The main aim of this special issue of the Journal is to promote a reflection on the relationship between phenomenology and cognition by focusing in particular on whether there is a phenomenology characteristic of the cognitive level and in the positive case to consider how this phenomenology is related to the sensory/perceptual one (on the ongoing debate on this issue see Bayne, Montague, eds., 2011). According to a position which has dominated until recently the debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences (“the conservative position” exemplified for example by Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 2007; Tye, 1995; Carruthers, 2005), only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states would either utterly lack it or  inherit their phenomenology from some of their accompanying sensory states. The conservative position has recently been contested by a number of people (Strawson, 1994; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004; Horgan and Tienson, 2002) who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. They have thereby promoted, within the ongoing debate on phenomenal consciousness in the analytic philosophy, a theoretical approach that is sympathetic and consonant with how this issue has been dealt with within the phenomenological tradition. That a synergy within these two traditions could prove fruitful in this area of inquiry is a widely shared conviction. Therefore, contributions aiming at stimulating a dialogue between these two traditions on the topic at hand will be particularly welcome.

We therefore invite contributions on the following and connected topics:

  • Can thoughts be conscious? In the positive case, in which sense of this polysemous notion?
  • Is it possible to account for our having knowledge of our occurring mental states without positing the existence of a cognitive phenomenology?
  • If there really is a cognitive phenomenology, how it is actually featured?
  • How can the relationship between the cognitive and the sensory phenomenology be conceived?
  • Which implications has the issue of the cognitive penetration of perception or other mental states for the debate on cognitive phenomenology?
  • How would the admission of the existence of a cognitive phenomenology reverberate on the current theorizations of phenomenal consciousness?


The special issue of the journal will also host invited papers by some of the most leading figures of the international debate on this topic such as: Tim Bayne, Clotilde Calabi, Marta Jorba, Anders Nes, Gianfranco Soldati.


Submission details:
Submissions for the Summer 2016 issue of Phenomenology and Mind should be sent to by March 30th, 2016. E-mails containing submissions should bear the title “PaM CPD submission.” Manuscripts should not exceed 40,000 characters in length (spacing included). For stylistic details, see Submissions must be prepared for double blind review. Manuscripts should not contain any identifying information and must be accompanied by a separate cover sheet containing the name of the author(s), title of the submitted paper, the author’s affiliation (if any) and contact information, and an abstract of no more than 500 characters. Notification of acceptance or refusal will be sent by April 30th  2016.

For any further information, please contact:

Tags: , , , ,

Lascia un commento

Il tuo indirizzo email non sarà pubblicato. I campi obbligatori sono contrassegnati *