Che tipo di oggetto è il dovere? La deontica filosofica di Alexius Meinong e France Veber

sabato, novembre 6, 2010
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Milano, 11-12 novembre 2010
Sala di lettura del Dipartimento “Cesare Beccaria”
Sezione di Filosofia e sociologia del diritto

Giovedì, 11 novembre 2010, ore 15, sala di lettura
Venanzio Raspa (Università di Urbino), Il Sollen nella teoria del valore di Alexius Meinong
Matjaž Potrč (Università di Lubiana), France Veber: da dove provengono i doveri come oggetti?

Venerdì, 12 novembre 2010, ore 10, sala di lettura
Emanuele Marini (Università di Milano), Etica e diritto in France Veber
Marko Trajković (Università di Niš), La filosofia del diritto naturale di Radomir D. Lukić

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4 commenti a Che tipo di oggetto è il dovere? La deontica filosofica di Alexius Meinong e France Veber

  1. Silvia Goi
    giovedì, novembre 18, 2010 at 11:14

    Dear sirs,
    I was most interested in Meinong’s work and studies but had no occasion to know about the date of this congress. I wonder if there’s anything as important as this in slovenian studies or philosophical Graz school and I ask you a response as soon as possible. Many thanks, anyway.

  2. Matjaz Potrc
    sabato, dicembre 4, 2010 at 11:32

    There will be a small congress on Veber in Slovenia, Gornja Radgona, on April 16, 2011, with, as we hope, Matjaz Potrc, Emanuele Marini, Venanzio Raspa, Dale Jacquette, Vojko Strahovnik, and others.

  3. Silvia Goi
    martedì, febbraio 15, 2011 at 13:01

    I’ve notice your reply just today. The congress offers many attractives to who’s studying XX century Kantism. Especially Kohlberg seems involved in this research and I’d be glad to be there. Unfortunately Gornija Radgona is nearer to Hungarn than to the Italian coast… I’ll try to considerate the opportunity.

    Silvia Goi

  4. Silvia Goi
    sabato, marzo 19, 2011 at 12:13

    Veber’s work tempted the contemporary instruments (in a larger sense) to give objectivity a new fundament. Considering impossible, or better, without logical foundation every moral assertion about reality, he seems obliged, throught cartesian deduction, to construct a ‘MORAL OBJECT’, meaning with this an object intrinsecally DEFINIBLE AS moral. Quite in a ‘logical trap’ (unnecessarity of the OBJECT in that peculiar sense is evident to new logical points of views, even not connected with conventionalism). He was in want of a basis, logical fundaments for a moral disquisition. The same questin appears on the edge in mathematical patterns of the time. A ‘justification’, or better said a deduction, in the kantian sense of the term?

    SILVIA GOI

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