We are pleased to announce the publication on Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences of the paper “Bodily Expressions, Feelings, and the Direct Perception Account of Social Cognition” by Francesca Forlè.
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition (DP), focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least some mental states of others through their bodily expressions. I will investigate the way we should consider expressions and their relations to mental phenomena in order to defend DP. In order to do so, I will present Krueger and Overgaard’s idea of expressions as constitutive proper parts of the mental phenomena expressed and I will show how this position can support DP. Then, I will present the way in which the authors seem to construe the relation of parthood between expressions and mental states – that is in terms of components (or, pieces, as I will argue) of integral wholes, and I will introduce the possible issues that derive from this strategy. I will propose a different way to understand this parthood relation, referring to Husserl’s notion of moments as distinct from that of pieces (Husserl 1900-1901). I will narrow my analysis to expressions of feelings, and I will try to argue that they can be described more aptly as moments of the feelings expressed. Finally, I will show how this account can support DP.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences web page: https://link.springer.com/journal/11097
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